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ABSTRACT
After-action reports are important texts that make sense of moments of crisis and
restore organizational order. We add to existing research on these reports by incorporating the rhetorical concepts of terministic screens and the pentad to understand
how reports commemorate disorder and organizational trauma. Analyzing the multiple reports created after the 2017 Las Vegas Shooting, we find that reports from
different professional fields commemorate crises in disparate ways that select and
deflect memories of trauma. This study extends risk and crisis studies of crisis documentation by highlighting the emotional role reports play in making sense of organizational trauma and considering how professional fields influence post-crisis rhetoric
of renewal.
KEYWORDS: after-action reports, sensemaking, terministic screens, organizational
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The Las Vegas Shooting that occurred on October 1, 2017, was
the deadliest mass shooting in U.S. history. A lone gunman fired
down from a hotel room window into a country music festival
on the Las Vegas Strip, killing 60 people and injuring hundreds
more. Local, state, and federal law enforcement, fire departments,
and emergency medical service providers flooded the scene to
transport survivors to hospitals, locate the shooter, and ultimately
launch an investigation into the effectiveness of the multiagency
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response. In the aftermath of the incident, multiple organizations had to make sense of their shared crisis response. Five afteraction reports captured the events of 1 October1 in attempts to
make sense of what occurred that night, what organizations did
effectively, and what organizational practices should be improved.
After-action reports (AARs), accident reports, and post-crisis
inquiries are significant organizational texts that serve multiple
purposes after crises.2 Reports can generate insight into preventing
future crises and create an understandable narrative out of chaotic
events (Brown, 2004; Gephart et al., 1990). Reports are not simply
factual accounts of crises; instead, they are made up of decision
points where rhetorical choices direct attention toward certain
perspectives. That is, AARs seek to reconcile conflicting points of
view to create a coherent and persuasive account of both the crisis
and, often, who is at fault (Dwyer et al., 2021). Here, we use an
organizational rhetoric lens to understand how AARs function as
reflections of the various stakeholders involved in crisis response,
their priorities, and their professional biases. Organizational rhetorical studies are interested in how organizations create written
texts that help them achieve their goals by persuading and influencing readers (Offerdal et al., 2021), whether intentionally or as
byproducts of their reconstruction of events.
Studies of AARs to date have focused on how reports restore
order, but scholarship can do more to understand how multiple
organizations make sense of the same crisis and even promote
healing or renewal after the crisis (Ulmer et al., 2007). AARs are
likely to be written more frequently in the coming decades as natural disasters escalate (Woods, 2020) and multiple organizations
must respond to them. To contribute to our understanding of
AARs and the ways they make sense of crises, we use two rhetorical concepts by Kenneth Burke that center decision-making and
symbolic choices. First, we use the rhetorical concept of terministic screens to highlight that any recounting of a crisis necessarily
1. Henceforth we name this incident 1 October to mirror the local and report terminology (Montero, 2018).
2. After-action reports are also sometimes called after-action reviews or post-crisis
inquiry reports. We refer to all reports in this genre as after-action reports throughout
the paper.
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selects certain events and details and simultaneously deflects other
parts of organizational experiences (Burke, 1966). Second, we use
the rhetorical concept of the pentad to understand how crises are
reconstructed differently, with different emphases, which leads to
different crisis responses and suggestions for future preparation.
Guided by these rhetorical concepts, our qualitative content analysis of 1 October reports explores what reports emphasize and
downplay and the differences that emerge between the reports.
This study extends risk and crisis communication research in
two ways: First, it introduces new rhetorical tools to consider how
different professional fields of risk and crisis practitioners influence post-crisis sensemaking, and second, it expands the rhetoric
of renewal to consider official documents. In what follows, we first
expand on the theoretical foundations of crisis communication,
AARs, terministic screens, and the pentad. Then, we detail our
methods before examining findings from our comparative analysis. We conclude by reiterating the importance of organizational
rhetoric as an area of study and reflect on the points of convergence and divergence in AARs as impactful for public, organizational, and interorganizational memory.

Literature Review
Studying AARs creates the opportunity to examine how various
organizations make sense of shared crises. An organizational crisis
is an event that begins with an unexpected trigger and creates high
levels of risk and potential loss for the organization (Seeger et al.,
2003). While crises can be destructive to the organization’s members, reputation, and existence, crises are also opportunities for
renewal, learning, and understanding (Seeger & Ulmer, 2002). As
such, how organizations choose to remember crises and preserve
corresponding lessons has implications for their future resilience
(Rice & Jahn, 2020). AARs are an important site of remembering
that can create improvements in organizational activities that prevent future crises. We should also recognize that reports are made
up of rhetorical choices and thus serve an inherently persuasive
function. Risk and crisis communication scholars have drawn on
rhetorical concepts including narrative theory to understand how
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order is restored via storytelling (Seeger et al., 2003) and ethos to
examine challenges to authority during a crisis (Offerdal, 2021).
Scholars proposing a rhetoric of renewal have argued that crises
are opportunities for organizations to learn and heal after a crisis
(Ulmer et al., 2007). This research tends to focus on leaders’ rhetoric (Ulmer et al., 2007); however, renewal expands beyond leader
communication to include memorials (Veil et al., 2011) and, we
argue, organizational texts.
Risk and crisis scholars have already documented numerous
purposes of AARs. These reports serve as sensemaking tools for
practitioners, creating a coherent and authoritative account of crises (Brown, 2004). They can also reestablish public trust and positive perception of the organization (Gephart et al., 1990). Reports
tend to be treated as sites of rule development and organizational
learning (Jahn, 2016). When findings are released, practitioners
must make sense of the reports, assess their resonance, and adjust
practices to accommodate report recommendations (Dwyer et al.,
2021). Reports and their subsequent recommendations also serve
as resources in member interactions and become tools that inform
future actions (Jahn, 2016). Attempts at fact-finding are often
complicated and incomplete due to the chaos caused by disasters
(Andrade et al., 2020). While these studies highlight the role of
reports in reestablishing order after a crisis, more research can be
done to consider how reports can also contribute to renewal and
healing.
After-action reviews can also be situated in the broader rhetorical situation of crisis response. Scholarship in this area has already
identified and assessed rhetorical strategies available to organizations and individuals, including image repair strategies (Benoit
& Henson, 2009; Coombs, 2006). Benoit and Henson, analyzing
presidential rhetoric, found that strategies can include taking corrective action, bolstering the reputation of the speaker, and framing
the crisis as an unprecedented challenge. AARs play an important
part in what Coombs (2006) terms sharing “instructing information” about a crisis, or basic facts that stakeholders may need about
the crisis (p. 246). Official documentation can also deny or diminish organizational blame for the crisis and answer questions about
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evidence and the locus of blame for the crisis (Sellnow & Ulmer,
2004). AARs serve an important role in crisis response strategies.
Further research can also examine what viewpoints are documented in AARs, especially as crises frequently involve and will
continue to involve multiple organizations in coming decades
(Rice, 2022). Professional fields, or viewpoints drawn from
career expertise, play an important role in the interpretation of
AARs (Dwyer et al., 2021). We know that risk and crisis practitioners must read and make sense of AARs to understand how
these reports should inform how they do their jobs. Despite our
understanding that professional fields influence the interpretation
of reports, less is known about how professions influence the construction of reports in the first place. We consider how different
professional fields created different accounts of the same event to
enhance understanding of how multiple organizations converge or
diverge on their interpretation of crises.
An Organizational Rhetoric Framework for Analyzing
Reports
AARs function rhetorically by shaping organizational understanding of crises. We draw on Burke’s (1966) concepts of terministic screens and the pentad to examine how organizational
understanding involves selections and deflections about the event
that are informed by the organization’s perspective. Terministic
screens refer to how all language involves selections and deflections in where we point our attention; thus, every choice to select
one aspect or feature for inclusion in official reports is simultaneously a “deflection” of other choices (Burke, 1966, p. 44). Symbolic
choices about how to represent events are biased and non-neutral.
AARs are informed by the terministic screens of various professions that “direct attention away from some interpretations and
toward others” (Burke, 1966, p. 45). Terministic screens become
accepted vocabularies that may dictate future rhetorical choices.
Different terministic screens lead to different choices of emphasis, which may result in very different perspectives and retellings
of the same reality (Burke, 1966). Unlike the related concept of
framing, terministic screens are self-reinforcing concepts whereby
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the language, or terminology, that we use to understand reality
influences the vocabularies available to us in future situations. In
other words, our terministic screens develop over time to prevent
us from considering other perspectives, vocabularies, and ways of
knowing, which Burke referred to as a “trained incapacity” (Burke,
1966, p. 189). Over time, the development of one’s experiences,
education and training can influence our perspectives, and “abilities can function as [inabilities]” that prevent certain ways of
understanding situations (Burke, 1935, p. 7).
Burke proposed the term casuistic stretching to describe how
we engage with adjustments to our terministic screens. At times
of struggle, old vocabularies may be modified or extended to
adapt to new situations (Burke, 1984). When that stretching cannot fully make sense of the new situation, the framework might
break, causing a new one to be formed in its place. This process
can upend people’s ways of life, so instead of adopting new frameworks, people often make language choices to “reduce perceived
incompatibilities” between the old and new principles (Tschirhart
& Bloomfield, 2020, p. 699). In other words, people tend to stick
with pre-established vocabularies instead of stretching them but
may be forced to stretch or abandon them given changing circumstances, such as those involved in crisis.
To explore these relative emphases in the retelling of events,
Burke (1945) offered the pentad, which is a series of five terms
(act, agent, agency, scene, and purpose) that compose the elements
of any event. For Burke, retellings of all events include an emphasis on some of these elements and a de-emphasis of others, which
indicates different underlying worldviews and ideologies (Bloomfield & Tscholl, 2018). Attending to pentadic terms can offer rhetorical insight into how various organizations engage with crises
in how they characterize the act, the agents involved, the relevant
agency and purpose, and the appropriate scope of the scene. In
addition to focusing on individual components within the pentad,
rhetorical scholars also track the ratios between the terms to interpret perspective, motive, and implications.
Organizational scholars have already engaged with the pentad
to understand how the organization is framed as a scene that is
positioned as dictating member choices (Meisenbach et al., 2008).
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Scene has the potential to be powerful during sense-making in
emergencies as well, as the emergency itself can be framed as dictating subsequent response. For example, does the surrounding
Las Vegas community after 1 October count as part of the scene?
Agents are additionally a potential point of selection and deflection for AARs, especially as these reports make sense of multiple
responding agents from different organizations and professions
and choose which activities and agents to draw attention to over
others.
Using rhetorical theories, this project interrogates AARs from
1 October to ask the following research question:
RQ: How do after-action reports select and deflect aspects of the
crisis relevant to their professional fields’ terministic screens?

Methods
Data Collection and Analysis
Data collection included a thorough search for reports related to
the Las Vegas shooting conducted in the fall of 2020. By this time,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department (LVMPD), and Nevada Hospital Association (NHA)
had all published reports, ranging from criminal investigations
(LVMPD, the FBI) to AARs that sought to reflect on the organizational responses (FEMA, LVMPD, NHA). After conducting a
complete search for reports, the authors read all five reports for
first impressions of report purposes. We removed the criminal
reports and focused on the three AARs for the purpose of analysis
(for a summary of reports, see Table 1).
During data analysis, the three AARs were coded using NVIVO,
a qualitative data analysis software. Analysis was conducted using
multiple phases of coding. First, the first author engaged in primary level coding, asking what was occurring throughout each
report and establishing codes to break segments of data down by
line (Lindlof & Taylor, 2019). Analysis used the constant comparative method to compare new data to already created codes, generating new codes for new phenomena in the data and adding depth
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TABLE 1

Overview of Reports and Findings
Page
Count

Agency

Report Purpose

Key Findings

Federal
Emergency
Management
Agency (FEMA)

“...distributing
best practices and
lessons learned for
other communities
around the country
to better prepare
for a mass casualty
incident should one
occur” (p. i).

61

“Strong cross-agency
collaboration is critical
for a quick and effective
response.
Response training that
is tailored to address
an incident of mass
violence is an especially
valuable preparedness
investment.
Coordinated, crossagency planning for
an incident of mass
violence is necessary for
successful outcomes”
(p. 1).

Nevada
Hospital
Administration
(NHA)

“provide
supplemental
hospital emergency
management
educational
material via the case
study of one of the
worst mass-casualty
incidents to occur in
our nation’s history”
(p. 3).

67

26 insights and
recommendations,
including: hospitals
had no notice of the
event, there was a lack
of situational awareness,
there was a surge in
patients, throughput
of patients was key,
issues with patient
registration, supplies
ran low.

Las Vegas
Metropolitan
Police
Department
(LVMPD)

Detail overall police
response and
document “lessons
learned” (p. 1).

164

93 findings organized
by categories including
preparedness,
law enforcement
departments,
leadership, equipment,
and training.
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and changing understanding to already created codes (Charmaz,
2014). Primary coding yielded 168 codes, indicating the breadth
of topics covered throughout the reports. Informal observation
of codes suggested that there were some points where reports
converged and other points where they differed. As a result, the
secondary coding cycle compared codes to the research question
to clarify relationships (Charmaz, 2014). During secondary coding, the first author grouped codes together to create categories of
like codes and to observe the relationship and value among those
codes. This analysis yielded three points of convergence in the
reports and two points of divergence, discussed next.

Results
Points of Convergence
The reports converged on three themes: (1) the scene as uncontrollable and controlling, (2) the clash of professional fields, and
(3) the importance of future planning and lessons learned from
this event.
Scene as Uncontrollable and Controlling
The reports converged upon the scene as influential over agents’
actions, deploying a scene–act ratio. The unprecedented nature of
these events simultaneously compelled organizations to respond
and challenged existing plans of action to launch appropriate
responses to the unanticipated circumstances. The reports converge around the theme that the event scene was uncontrollable,
thereby constraining the potential acts of agents within the scene.
Instead of first responders having control over the scene and their
actions, the AARs portrayed the scene as placing demands on the
organizations involved and thereby causing them to act. Such a
rhetorical choice can be a strategy to downplay culpability, shifting blame to a scene that compels action as opposed to being a
conscious, free choice of the agent. These reports show a potential
motive to downplay the responsibility of the agencies in the sense
that the groups were doing the best they could under difficult,
unprecedented circumstances and thus should not be admonished

96

RICE and BLOOMFIELD

but praised. Additionally, such an emphasis on the scene could also
be a strategy to highlight the unique circumstances of the scene to
garner attention to the problem and the importance of preparing
for future incidents of this nature.
All of the reports mentioned the fatality count and qualified
the mass shooting as the largest in U.S. history. For example, the
FEMA report (2018) opened by saying that “public safety agencies
worked together to mount a collaborative, coordinated response
to an incident of mass violence unlike any the nation had ever
seen” (p. 50). Other quantities, for example, the number of supplies needed, ambulances dispatched, and the square footage
over which the victims were spread out, were used throughout
the reports to characterize the shooting as vast in size and scope.
The NHA report (Lake, 2018) emphasized that hospitals faced “the
sudden unanticipated need to start more than 1,000 IVs on one
night” (p. 12).
In addition to the number of victims, the reports often called
this event “unpredictable and unprecedented” (Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 2019, p. 11). In particular, the NHA
report (Lake, 2018) repeatedly mentioned that victims began
arriving at hospitals with little to no warning to those organizations. The report characterized the shooting by saying, “America
has never seen an incident of this type or scale. This situation and
subsequent response helped to identify areas where additional
planning, exercises and assumptions are necessary based on the
changing world and social environment in which we now live”
(p. 3). As a result, the reports praised organizations by citing the
size and scope of the incident to explain that the organizations
operated well, given the constraints.
The FEMA report explicitly noted this by explaining that there
was not enough tracking as patients were quickly transported to
hospitals. FEMA (2018) concluded that “While foregoing patient
documentation on scene allows for an expedited transport process,
it complicates patient accountability at the hospital and possibly
hinders family reunification. Due to the size, scope, and complexity of this incident, it is an acceptable deficiency” (p. 22). Each
report treated the scene as creating demands that organizations
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responded to as best that they could. These descriptions were used
to praise organizational responses as constrained by a period of
overwhelming trauma and thus situates deficiencies and difficulties as results of the scene and not the agents’ actions.
Clash of Professional Fields
Another point of convergence across the reports was the commitment to preserving the clashes between responding organizations.
While this theme evokes disagreements between organizations
involved, this shared finding preserves the conflicts as a challenge
to the response that is important to keep in mind for future crises.
These descriptions emphasized how terministic screens resulted
in trained incapacities for communicating, collaborating, and
responding effectively to the crisis caused by professional affiliations, norms, and training. In particular, multiple reports mentioned institutional barriers between professions; for example, U.S.
patient privacy laws like HIPAA, which constrains what type of
information can be released about hospital patients. The LVMPD
and FEMA reports noted that this created challenges to victim
identification. FEMA (2018) invalidated these concerns by saying that “perceived restrictions for sharing personally identifiable
information made completing a deconflicted patient and deceased
list very difficult” (p. 40, emphasis added). Conversely, the NHA
report (Lake, 2018) explained this lag in identification as a professional necessity, as “the numbers of patients, tempo at which they
arrived at area hospitals and acuity levels stayed steady, it was difficult to register everyone. Electronic health record (EHR) systems
and registration clerks simply couldn’t keep up. Patients needed
immediate surgery” (p. 12).
The reports also identified a lack of collaboration among professions as an area for future improvement. The LVMPD report
(2019) said that hospital professionals were not in the shared “command post” during the response, had not been included in previous
mass casualty exercises, and that “the inclusion of medical professionals may have facilitated the relatively urgent task of establishing patient identification and tracking” (p. 105). Similarly, the
NHA (Lake, 2018) suggested that jargon from other professional
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fields created confusion for hospital workers, and instead of using
acronyms, “several hospitals felt it would have been better if callers
simply explained who the parent organization is that they were
working for” (p. 21). The reports all remembered conflict among
responding organizations as a challenge throughout the response.
In doing so, they converged on an identified problem in terms of
collaboration and communication across professional fields that
should be both remembered and addressed in the future.
The trained incapacities were caused by materials structures
of the scene such as the technology used, but also by professional
norms and jargon, which created terministic screens that prevented communication and collaboration. For example, norms of
how to express information are not innate, but built through the
professional agencies over time to become concretized as organizational norms that are not meant to be violated. In addition to a
compelling and difficult scene due to the crisis, the scene of each
organization’s norms and expectations also limited agents’ abilities
to act. Each group’s terministic screens and trained incapacities
resisted casuistic stretching and adjustment and thus halted clear
and effective communication between the responding agencies.
Future Orientation
The reports all supported a future orientation: rather than looking
back to cast blame for the shooting, the reports tended to focus on
future planning and improving crisis responses. Overwhelmingly,
the reports addressed failures from 1 October by suggesting more
training. Although differences in training led to some of the perceived incompatibilities discussed in the previous section, trainings were still emphasized as a way to create future preparedness.
LVMPD (2019) suggested additional training 16 times throughout the report, while FEMA (2018) suggested additional training
12 times. Of these suggested trainings, FEMA proposed training
on triaging a bleeding person, training on ordering resources to
the scene of an emergency, joint training with medical providers,
and additional training for city and county employees. The NHA
(Lake, 2018) suggested more documentation of knowledge so that
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procedures are not based on “personalities” in future emergencies (p. 63). By this, the report suggested that current knowledge
and relationships resided in individuals within the organizations
rather than more formal documentation. LVMPD similarly recommended that procedures be formalized to preserve knowledge.
The reports also framed 1 October as part of a changing landscape of threat. The NHA (Lake, 2018) directed attention to this
problem as part of the report’s purpose, saying that “This situation
and subsequent response helped to identify areas where additional
planning, exercises and assumptions are necessary based on the
changing world and social environment in which we now live”
(p. 3). The LVMPD linked the shooting to additional mass shootings around the world as if to argue that these events are proliferating, and more training and plans are needed to prepare for
them. The LVMPD report (2019) found that despite the agency
studying previous mass shootings, “policies were not sufficiently
robust to handle the magnitude of what happened on 1 October”
(p. 103). FEMA (2018) wrote that the incident could “inform
future response efforts and protect responders and the communities they serve” (p. 50). The reports framed mass shootings as part
of an inevitable future and positioned preparedness and training
as necessary solutions.
By emphasizing the scene these reports directed attention away
from blaming organizations to instead suggest improvements
in responding to future threats. The implications of this choice
is to remove culpability from the agencies authoring the reports
regarding past incidents, but still position them as future agential
heroes, which with future training could be even more equipped
to respond within a changing scene.
Points of Divergence
Despite prominent overlaps, the reports diverged on two important themes, which reflected different selections and deflections
of how to remember 1 October: (1) differences in negotiating old
and new principles and (2) differences in responses to professional
boundaries around trauma.
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Negotiating Old and New Principles
First, the reports treated improvisation, adaptation, and changes
to procedure differently, marking whether casuistic stretching of
existing protocols was needed or whether to resist casuistic stretching by reifying old principles. Each report included remembrances
of quick thinking that seemed necessary to the response, especially
given the scope of help needed and the pace of unfolding events.
However, the professional frames of the reports led to different
conclusions. In particular, FEMA, representing the U.S. federal
government perspective on 1 October, acknowledged improvisation but encouraged future preparedness to continue to follow
rules and procedures, while the local reports treated improvisation
as necessary and even generative of new knowledge. Such rhetorical differences may be expected due to FEMA’s scope being over
national boundaries and thus needing to emphasize generalizability across a variety of different scenes. Local reports, however,
are not beholden to such audience restrictions and may be more
willing to celebrate the acts of groups operating within the unique
circumstances of the Vegas scene.
The FEMA report (2018) included multiple findings that
suggested that organizations failed to follow the rules. The
report opened by saying that “when agencies followed preestablished plans and procedures, they improved communication and strengthened the response. Where plans were not integrated or not widely known and understood by responders across
all responding agencies, difficulties arose” (p. 1). Here, the report
tied plans and procedures to interorganizational success, as these
guides facilitate shared actions. An illustrative example of this is
that the FEMA report condemned ambulances for transporting
patients without first checking in at a staging area. The FEMA
report (2018) acknowledged that “timely patient care is critical for any incident, but some fire department units that assisted
patients did not communicate to command or staging that they
were occupied and unable to report to the staging area to receive
an assignment” (p. 21). The FEMA report (2018) also criticized
the improvisation of off-duty first responders, and noted that
“as ambulances arrived, responders, concert-goers, and wellintentioned bystanders removed medical supplies from them to
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support on-scene response; however, the ambulances in turn were
being rendered less effective without these supplies” (p. 22). The
terministic screen of FEMA, which emphasized the importance of
existing protocols, deflected improvisation as a useful and prudent
measure to incorporate into crisis management. These statements
also communicate a resistance to casuistic stretching, whereby
even the acknowledged difficulties of the scene should not deter
agents from following standard procedures.
Conversely, the NHA report praised the improvisation of first
responders and civilians. As the NHA (Lake, 2018) said, “human
factors and ingenuity were observed from everyone involved.
Many concert goers put themselves at great personal risk to save
people they’d never met” (p. 37). The LVMPD report (2019)
focused less on improvisation by the community and instead discussed the improvisation of on-duty police officers. For example,
the LVMPD report (2019) praised a police officer who saw that the
position of staging manager was unfilled and “assigned himself to
the position where he remained until he was relieved” (p. 38). The
reports ultimately suggested different actions (i.e., following previous trainings versus improvising) and treated interference with
and adjustments to proper procedures differently in response.
The suggestions for organizational learning that followed from
these findings also diverged. The FEMA report (2018) recommended further (FEMA) trainings to help personnel remember
procedures during stressful situations to deter improvisation; it
reinforced that additional trainings were needed because “protocol
is especially critical when managing incidents of this geographic
size, magnitude, and complexity” (p. 20). Conversely, NHA and
LVMPD findings encouraged the codification of successful improvisations from the incident so that they could be remembered in
future emergencies. The NHA (Lake, 2018) reported that “it was
the hospitals’ ability to move the patient quickly through triage
and the emergency department to surgery that was the main determinant of appropriate care. Steps should be taken to memorialize
these processes and standard operating protocols created” (p. 34).
LVMPD (2019) suggested that trainings should occur at the local
level to bring multiple organizations together and encouraged the
preservation of knowledge about how to perform various roles.
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The NHA and LVMPD reports thus engaged in casuistic
stretching whereby the old principles were modified to include the
successful improvisations caused by the 1 October crisis. Instead
of shattering the old protocols, as a group like FEMA might fear
if old principles were to be modified, the NHA and LVMPD
welcomed what they viewed as useful insights gleaned from the
incident. All of the reports suggested memorializing knowledge,
but this knowledge differed dramatically depending on the professional point of view, with the federal perspective suggesting a
return to previous protocols and local organizations seeking to
commemorate local improvisations.
Professional Boundaries around Trauma
The reports also differed in the treatment and boundaries around
trauma, with some organizations acknowledging shared trauma
among organizational members and other reports treating trauma
as external to the organization and therefore outside of the scope
of AARs. Here, terministic screens and the pentad help explain
how professional orientations change the relevant scope of the crisis and the extent to which trauma is included as a relevant factor
in crisis responses.
The NHA report (Lake, 2018) most clearly acknowledged emotional trauma to doctors and nurses caused by treating wounded
patients. This included drawing from direct quotations of organizational members; for example, “‘I felt like I needed to be an
emotional superhero for these people,’ and, ‘It was difficult not
to break down yourself and cry with each story being sadder or
more heart-wrenching than the next’” (p. 11). The NHA report
(Lake, 2018) used words like “emotion” and “trauma” throughout;
for example, “Many responders and staff members still suffer from
the events of that day. The emotional and psychological wounds,
horrific memories and difficult humanitarian interactions with the
injured and their families may never fully dissipate” (p. 3). The
NHA treated trauma as internal to hospitals, thereby including
trauma under the scope of the scene of NHA’s (Lake, 2018) crisis response, especially by noting that hospitals felt their security
was threatened. This was because “hospitals were being told that
additional gunmen were seen on their campuses, and the rumors
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of multiple attacks made hospitals feel as though they could be
the next soft target” (p. 16). Trauma breached the organizational
boundaries of hospitals, and, as a result, the NHA reported that
hospitals developed strategies to defend those boundaries. The
NHA report overtly named and remembered trauma as internal
to the organization.
Conversely, the FEMA (2018) and LVMPD (2019) reports
were more likely to acknowledge trauma to “victims” or civilians
that first responders assisted. The reports used more formal and
less emotional terms, like “debriefing” and “employee wellbeing,”
to discuss the impact of the shooting on organizational members.
The terministic screens of FEMA and LVMPD included more professional and formal language that consequently eschewed emotional engagement. For example, LVMPD (2019) reported that
“leadership also needed to consider the health and wellbeing of
LVMPD personnel—during and after the incident” (p. 88). This
report also noted that many police officers returned to the debriefing site “exhausted” (p. 41). While the reports both mention offers
of counseling, the LVMPD and FEMA reports referred to the reasons for this counseling as exhaustion and “mental and physical
welfare” (FEMA, 2018, p. 48). When mental health was discussed,
it was often labeled as “stress,” for example, in FEMA’s (2018)
reporting of “stress debriefing” available to first responders (p. 48).
In the FEMA and LVMPD reports, civilians endured trauma,
making the scene of trauma external to the organization. Both
reports praised the victim assistance center opened after 1 October, and FEMA (2018) explained that it provided “long-term
support to victims, many of whom were not injured but experienced mental health problems and associated issues, including lost wages due to post-traumatic stress disorder” (p. 47).
This was, strikingly, the only mention of post-traumatic stress
in the FEMA report. LVMPD (2019) similarly only mentioned
post-traumatic stress once as something supervisors should look
out for in case it emerged in any employees (p. 119). Thus, trauma
was treated as hypothetical or only linked to civilian “victims”
instead of an expected part of organizational impacts, thereby
deflecting the potential to recognize trauma and value trauma
responses broadly and within organizations.
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The reports drew different boundaries around remembering
trauma, thereby adjusting the scope of the scene and the ability of
agents to suffer trauma within law and emergency management
organizations and delegating trauma as part of the scene to be
addressed (FEMA, 2018; LVMPD, 2019) or remembering trauma
as internal to healthcare organizations, their work, and members (Lake, 2018). Ironically, even though all of the organizations
deployed a scene-act ratio in acknowledging the restrictions the
scene placed on their ability to act in their professional capacities, only the NHA acknowledged how the controlling, unprecedented power of the scene might also have influenced agents’
emotional and personal well-being beyond their agent status as
first responders.

Discussion
We studied multiple AARs generated from the same crisis to
understand how reports remember and forget organizational
trauma. This research contributes to the understanding of risk and
crisis communication in several ways: (1) by demonstrating that
organizational documentation can work to commemorate disorder versus simply to restore order after a crisis, (2) by introducing new rhetorical analysis tools for understanding how crises are
interpreted, and (3) by highlighting the importance of studying
multiorganizational crisis response.
First, this study adds to scholarly understanding of crisis communication by analyzing how after-action reports and written texts
more broadly contribute to rhetorics of renewal. Research on rhetorics of renewal has focused on leadership communication (Ulmer
et al., 2007); however, organizational texts are also important rhetorical artifacts that serve a function in the crisis recovery process.
Ulmer et al. suggested that renewal rhetoric is characterized by
provisional communication, prospective outlook, optimism, and
effective leadership. Here, we find that after-action reports can also
engage in rhetoric of renewal, in particular by commemorating disorder. Previous studies of AARs have examined how these reports
restore understanding of the world and trust in the organizations
involved (Boudes & Laroche, 2009). An additional function of
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AARs is to cope with highly stressful events. Therefore, AARs do
not just function logically to restore order; they can also function
to increase emotional understanding of these events. AARs need
not produce certainty about a crisis, and, as demonstrated here,
they can also be open and provisional in their retelling of events
(Ulmer et al., 2007). The reports here included multiple aspects
that went beyond restoring legitimacy and instead preserved the
feelings of chaos, doubt, and confusion throughout the response.
This analysis adds to our understanding of the rhetoric of renewal
by noting that organizational texts may also serve a purpose in
renewal; however, this process does not only include looking forward, but also looking back in order to commemorate the trauma
and struggle of responding to the crisis.
Second, we introduce rhetorical tools to understand crisis rhetoric in new ways. Terministic screens allow us to examine how the
same crisis can be interpreted in multiple ways as organizations
involved select and deflect parts of that crisis (Burke, 1966). The
use of pentadic analysis demonstrates the importance of considering a scene’s circumference in crisis communication (Burke, 1945).
Studying multiple reports demonstrated that some organizations
preserved organizational trauma as part of the experience while
others downplayed trauma or treated it as external to the organization. A circumference broad enough to include the ongoing mental health impacts on responders and victims as part of the crisis
might encourage deliberative actions with mental health within its
scope. Conversely, narrowing the circumference eliminates such
considerations by making them irrelevant (Burke, 1945).
Similarly, a circumference that includes employees and
responders within the category of “victim” would direct attention
to services and support for their mental well-being in addition to
physical impacts. For practitioners, this introduction of new rhetorical tools demonstrates the policy effects of AAR choices. In
the case of 1 October, an LVMPD fund for victims continued to
downplay the mental effects of the shooting, with funds distributed based solely on the cost of treating bodily injuries (Survivor,
2018). Here, the report that downplayed trauma also corresponded
with later organizational actions that ignored the importance of
promoting mental, not just physical, recovery from that trauma.
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Pentadic analysis allows risk and crisis scholars to consider
how various elements of the crisis are highlighted and downplayed
to create reasonable explanations during crisis response. AARs are
just one aspect of crisis response strategies. They appear to serve
several purposes identified in broader crisis response research,
including crisis framing, self-enhancement for the organization
and renewal (Diers & Donohue, 2013). Pentadic analysis in particular allows scholars to look at how these crisis response strategies are accomplished and which elements of the crisis play a role.
The scene, in particular, appears to be an important rhetorical element that has already been identified as useful in the reputation
management strategy of “defeasibility,” or describing the event as
unprecedented (Benoit & Henson, 2009). Burke’s concepts allow
crisis communication scholars to examine further questions about
how the locus, or responsibility, for the crisis is constructed in texts
(Sellnow & Ulmer, 2004). Ultimately, pentadic analysis adds to our
understanding of crisis response strategies by providing a tool for
understanding how these strategies are accomplished.
Third, this study adds to the understanding of AARs by examining multiple reports about the same event. As emergencies transcend single organizational boundaries, multiple report-authoring
organizations can be involved in one crisis response. This study
demonstrates that AARs can be a site of professional clash and that
examining multiple reports from the same event creates opportunities to examine how different professional fields interpret the
same events. Using an organizational rhetoric perspective, we find
that professional fields function as terministic screens that select
and deflect different aspects of the same crisis in their memory
processes. This study adds understanding of how professional
frames influence sensemaking (Dwyer et al., 2021). For example,
the professional scope of FEMA constrained its ability to praise
improvisation over federal standards and procedures. Conversely,
the terministic screen of a more localized organization such as the
LVMPD did not constrain the ability to acknowledge the need for
on-the-ground adjustments to federal standards. Studying multiple reports of the same crisis generates insight into how reports
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interrelate (Boudes & Laroche, 2009). In AARs, organizations not
only comment on the tragedy but also their organizational operations and how they intersect with other organizations. Part of the
constraints of the particular scene of 1 October were the number
of organizations involved.

Conclusion
AARs are sites of organizational communication that include rhetorical choices about how to remember crises. This study adds
the consideration of new rhetorical tools that demonstrate that
AARs can commemorate disorder differently in their attempts
to create organizational renewal. We find that multiple organizational frames can clash in their post-crisis sensemaking efforts and
that different professional fields function as terministic screens
that select and deflect organizational trauma based on their own
boundaries and norms. This finding has serious implications for
organizational post-crisis learning, as reports that commemorated
trauma also tended to praise improvisation and flexibility during
crisis response. In other words, these reports were more likely to
adopt a new frame that accounted for changes in understanding
caused by shared trauma. This study extends crisis communication by highlighting that reports function as part of the rhetoric of
renewal by commemorating the disorder of organizational trauma
and looking toward future renewal. As cascading, increasing, and
prolonged crises impact our world, multiple organizations will
be called to respond and create resilience. AARs are an important site of this resilience work that demonstrates both rhetorical
opportunities and challenges for organizations working together
to respond to crises.
ORCID
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6678-5195
Rebecca M. Rice
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6211Emma Frances Bloomfield
4471

108

RICE and BLOOMFIELD

References
Andrade, E., Barrett, N., Edberg, M., Rivera, M., Latinovic,
L., Seeger, M., Goldman-Hawes, A., & Santos-Burgoa, C.
(2020). Mortality reporting and rumor generation: An assessment of crisis and emergency risk communication following
Hurricane María in Puerto Rico. Journal of International Crisis
and Risk Communication Research, 3(1), 15–48. https://doi.
org/10.30658/jicrcr.3.1.2
Benoit, W. L., & Henson, J. R. (2009). President Bush’s image repair
discourse on Hurricane Katrina. Public Relations Review, 35,
40–46. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2008.09.022
Bloomfield, E. F., & Tscholl, G. (2018). Analyzing warrants and
worldviews in the rhetoric of Donald Trump and Hillary
Clinton: Burke and argumentation in the 2016 presidential
election. KB Journal: The Journal of the Kenneth Burke Society,
13(2). http://kbjournal.org/analyzing_warrants_bloomfield_
tscholl
Boudes, T., & Laroche, H. (2009). Taking off the heat: Narrative
sensemaking in after action reports. Organization Studies,
30(4), 377–396. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840608101141
Brown, A. D. (2004). Authoritative sensemaking in a public
inquiry report. Organization Studies, 25(1), 95–112. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0170840604038182
Burke, K. (1935). Permanence and change. University of California
Press.
Burke, K. (1945). A grammar of motives. University of California
Press.
Burke, K. (1966). Language as symbolic action: Essays on life, literature, and method. University of California Press.
Burke, K. (1984). Attitudes toward history. University of California
Press.
Charmaz, K. (2014). Constructing grounded theory. SAGE.
Coombs, W. T. (2006). The protective powers of crisis response
strategies: Managing reputational assets during a crisis. Journal
of Promotion Management, 12(3–4), 241–260. https://doi.
org/10.1300/J057v12n03_13

Commemorating Disorder in After-Action Reports

109

Diers, A. R., & Donohue, J. (2013). Synchronizing crisis responses
after a transgression: An analysis of BP’s enacted crisis
response to the Deepwater Horizon crisis in 2010. Journal of
Communication Management, 17(3), 252–269. https://doi.
org/10.1108/JCOM-04-2012-0030
Dwyer, G., Hardy, C., & Maguire, S. (2021). Post-inquiry sensemaking: The case of the ‘Black Saturday’ Bushfires.
Organization Studies, 42(4), 637–661. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0170840619896271
FEMA. (2018). 1 October after-action report [Las Vegas Shooting].
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency; Clark
County (Nev.). FEMA. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=814668
Gephart, R. P., Steier, L., & Lawrence, T. (1990). Cultural rationalities in crisis sensemaking: A study of a public inquiry into
a major industrial accident. Industrial Crisis Quarterly, 4(1),
27–48. https://doi.org/10.1177/108602669000400102
Jahn, J. L. S. (2016). Adapting safety rules in a high reliability context: How wildland firefighting workgroups ventriloquize safety rules to understand hazards. Management
Communication Quarterly, 30(3), 362–389. https://doi.org/
10.1177/0893318915623638
Lake, C. K. (2018). A day like no other: A case study of the Las Vegas
mass shooting. Nevada Hospital Association. https://web.
archive.org/web/20201029071638/https://nvha.net/a-daylike-no-other-case-study-of-the-las-vegas-mass-shooting/
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. (2019). 1 October
after-action review. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department.
https://web.archive.org/web/20190711070651/https://
www.lvmpd.com/en-us/Documents/1_October_AAR_
Final_06062019.pdf
Lindlof, T. R., & Taylor, B. C. (2019). Qualitative communication
research methods (4th ed.). SAGE Publications.
Meisenbach, R. J., Remke, R. V., Buzzanell, P., & Liu, M. (2008). “They
allowed”: Pentadic mapping of women’s maternity leave discourse as organizational rhetoric. Communication Monographs,
75(1), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/03637750801952727

110

RICE and BLOOMFIELD

Montero, D. (2018, September 29). In Las Vegas, it’s called “1
October.” How the horrific mass shooting got its unusual
moniker. Los Angeles Times. https://web.archive.org/
web/20180930042233/https://www.latimes.com/nation/
la-na-vegas-shooting-name-20180918-story.html
Offerdal, T., Just, S., & Ihlen, Ø. (2021). Public ethos in the pandemic rhetorical situation: Strategies for building trust in
authorities’ risk communication. Journal of International Crisis
and Risk Communication Research, 4(2), 247–270. https://doi.
org/10.30658/jicrcr.4.2.3
Rice, R. M. (2022). Communicating authority in interorganizational collaboration. Routledge.
Rice, R. M., & Jahn, J. L. S. (2020). Disaster resilience as communication practice: Remembering and forgetting lessons from
past disasters through practices that prepare for the next one.
Journal of Applied Communication Research, 48(1), 136–155.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00909882.2019.1704830
Seeger, M. W., Sellnow, T. L., & Ulmer, R. R. (2003). Communication
and organizational crisis. Greenwood Publishing Group.
Seeger, M. W., & Ulmer, R. R. (2002). A post-crisis discourse of
renewal: The cases of Malden Mills and Cole Hardwoods.
Journal of Applied Communication Research, 30(2), 126–142.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00909880216578
Sellnow, T. L., & Ulmer, R. R. (2004). Ambiguity as an inherent
factor in organizational crisis communication. In D. P. Millar
& R. L. Heath (Eds.), Responding to crisis: A rhetorical approach
to crisis communication (pp. 251–262). Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
Survivor of 1 October disputes allocation of $31M Victims’ fund.
(2018, March 5). FOX5 Las Vegas. https://web.archive.org/
web/20220204164310/https://www.fox5vegas.com/news/
survivor-of-1-october-disputes-allocation-of-31m-victimsfund/article_db5e3d49-ef8a-5230-b0d9-0da5895ca52c.html
Tschirhart, P., & Bloomfield, E. F. (2020). Framing the Anthropocene
as influence or impact: The importance of interdisciplinary
contributions to stratigraphic classification. Environmental
Communication, 14(5), 698–711. https://doi.org/10.1080/175
24032.2020.1716033

Commemorating Disorder in After-Action Reports

111

Ulmer, R. R., Seeger, M. W., & Sellnow, T. L. (2007). Post-crisis
communication and renewal: Expanding the parameters of
post-crisis discourse. Public Relations Review, 33(2), 130–134.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2006.11.015
Veil, S. R., Sellnow, T. L., & Heald, M. (2011). Memorializing crisis:
The Oklahoma City national memorial as renewal discourse.
Journal of Applied Communication Research, 39(2), 164–183.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00909882.2011.557390
Woods, D. D. (2020). The strategic agility gap: How organizations
are slow and stale to adapt to turbulent worlds. In B. Journé,
H. Laroche, C. Bieder, & C. Gilbert, Human and organisational factors: Practices and strategies for a changing world (pp.
95–104). Springer Nature.

